Voting gaps of various kinds have existed for decades, evident both in voter turnout and voting behaviour. One of the more enduring gaps has been along gender lines. In the post WW2 period, women often voted to the right of men on the political spectrum, a phenomenon apparently driven by women’s greater religiosity and lower exposure to left-leaning institutions such as trade unions. This pattern was known as the “traditional gender voting gap.” In recent decades, however, women have increasingly shifted leftward. In the United States, for example, a greater proportion of women than men have voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in every election since 1980, marking what scholars now call the “modern gender gap.” Since the 1980s, this modern gender gap has emerged across many Western democratic nations, with women today voting more to the left and locating themselves further left on the ideological scale than men.
More recently, there appears to have been an uptick in this gap, particularly among the group dubbed the world’s most progressive generation: Gen Z. Popular media, as well as scholarly research, have documented a widening gender divide among Gen Z men and women, with young women moving further left, and young men swinging in the opposite direction. The 2024 US Presidential election highlighted this divide: more men aged 18 to 29 voted for Trump (49%) over Harris (47%), while only 37% of women the same age cast a ballot for Trump with the majority (61%) voting for Harris. Canadian survey data illustrates a comparable divergence. A CBC analysis of data from the Canadian Election Study revealed that young men and women used to give similar answers to the question “How much should be done for women?”, but by the 2015 election the number of women 30-and-under answering “more” had increased, while the number of men answering the same had flatlined.” Already in 2015, then, there was an early signal of a widening ideological distance that would become more pronounced in the years to follow.
What accounts for this shift, what are its possible consequences, and what if anything can be done about it? The data amassed by scholars and pollsters offer a number of possible explanations and prescriptions.
According to Abou-Chadi’s 2025 study, far-right support has risen among youth overall, but young men are especially likely to “consider” voting far right. His study suggests that gender differences in voting may appear first in openness or willingness to consider voting for a given party, even before vote shares shift substantially. Part of this change may be explained by a weakening link between class and political affiliation, and instead an uptick in identity politics. Canada’s 2025 federal election illustrated this shift: “The NDP’s waning influence in the 2025 election highlights the erosion of class-based solidarity, which has seemingly been supplanted by identity politics.”
Some scholars, like Campbell & Cowper-Coles, warn against treating this gender divide as a sudden rupture. They suggest instead that the phenomenon is a continuation of the existing gender gap, rather than a complete shift: “The tide is rising – it’s not a tsunami.” However, it is hard to ignore the statistics. A poll conducted by Abacus Data in 2025 showed that in Canada, “41 per cent of men under 30 backed the Conservatives, compared to 23 per cent of women in the same age bracket.” Abacus founder, David Coletto says “The demographic most likely today to say they’re going to vote Conservative in our polling are men under the age of 30.”
One explanation for this pattern is that the key points of divergence are no longer issues like immigration or the economy, but rather cultural questions. As one analyst notes, the “new” Conservatism in Canada is one that is “less likely to invoke religion or economics in public policy arguments, and focus instead on values, such as family or freedom.” Meanwhile, young women in Canada have continued to move left on gender equality and related cultural values, such as reproductive rights, while young men have not. That difference has been reflected in party platforms and voting behaviour, with young women favouring the Liberal Party over the Conservatives, in part because it is viewed as stronger defenders of reproductive rights.
This pattern seems to hold in the US as well. For example, an NBC News Decision Desk Poll shows that Gen Z men who voted for Trump rate having children as the most important measure of personal success, while Gen Z women who voted for Harris ranked having children second-to-last. Similarly, in response to the statement “a man who stays home to look after his children is less of a man,” 10% of baby boomer women and 11% of baby boomer men agreed. Among Gen Zs, however, there was an 11-point gap in opinion, 31% for men and 20% for women. It seems as though “young men are most resistant right now to change on a cultural level, not so much on an economic one.”
Some young men appear to be reacting against feminist change, creating backlash dynamics that can pull them toward the radical right. This trend towards backlash politics has occurred around the world, for example in South Korea’s 2022 election, where “a large majority of young men backed the self-described ‘anti-feminist’ presidential candidate Yoon Suk Yeol in South Korea.”
Whatever other factors may be at play, a major explanation for the Gen Z gap is the influence of algorithms and social media. Social media and algorithmic feeds appear to be amplifying an existing divergence between young women and men by exposing them to different information environments and subcultures. In a way unlike any other generation, men and women are literally being shown different information. If you indicate that you’re a male aged 18 to 35, social media platforms will show you something different than if you’re a female aged 18 to 35, meaning users are getting two different worlds of information based on both their own preferences and what the algorithms expect those preferences to be.
The effect of this phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of Gen Z gets their news primarily from social media. One example of this problem are male-targeted podcasts, which often have well over 80% male listeners. Canadian politicians have taken note of these online ecosystems. Pierre Poilievre has shown he is familiar with these worlds, and is keen to capitalize on them. In March 2026, for example, he made a lengthy appearance on the notoriously male-targetted Joe Rogan Experience podcast, and his own social media posts “can sometimes resemble manosphere-style podcasts.” When young people consume only curated, algorithmic information, echo chamber effects can arise, reinforcing in-group and out-group dynamics and accelerating polarization.
So, what should we do? Maybe it is not an issue that younger voters are dividing along gender lines. However, to ensure that future generations are able to vote based on fully informed views, it is imperative that schools teach media literacy. Algorithm-driven feeds are inevitable, but they hold a lot of power, so it is essential that young people are taught how it may be affecting their views. In addition, more transparency and regulation around social media, especially AI generated mis- and disinformation may protect younger generations from being influenced by extreme or inaccurate media. Finally, investing in structured cross-gender civic dialogue programs in schools and communities could help interrupt the feedback loops that algorithmic isolation creates, rebuilding the common ground that has eroded.
Citations
https://cawp.rutgers.edu/data/voters/gender-gaps-vote-choice-and-party-identification
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-elections/exit-polls
https://www.cbc.ca/news/investigates/canada-votes-election-conservative-divide-1.7507694
https://theconversation.com/what-the-voter-gender-divide-means-for-canadas-political-future-255857
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/14/us-election-donald-trump-voters-gender-race-data
Sofia Robinson
Research Assistant
Pearson Centre